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Does the theoretical framework change the legal end result for mature 
minors refusing medical treatment or creating self-generated 
pornography? 





The position, protection of and respect afforded to decisions made by those under 18 (the age 
of majority in England and Wales)
1
 has been much debated, particularly in the context of 
making decisions about health.  This is no accident because treatment involves bodily 
integrity and personal privacy and it would be ‘intolerable if patients had no right to control 
its delivery.’2  Some of the discourse has focused on ideas of children’s rights, and others 
have explored the concept of best interests, thereby mirroring legal concerns.
3
  The 
acknowledgement and protection of (some) rights can be seen in the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR) and the UK’s 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), for example, which place no age restrictions or limitations 
on those who enjoy the rights protected within.
4
  Thus, everyone has the same right to life, 
liberty and security of the person, and respect for private and family life.
5
  At the same time, 
there are other rights which are restricted to adults, including voting, buying alcohol and 
adopting,
6
 and the rights which specifically focus on children espoused in the United Nations 
Convention on Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC) have still not been incorporated into the 
UK’s domestic law.  This may be because if minors are recognised as ‘fully’ autonomous 
individuals with legally enforceable rights then this would conflict with the welfare principle 
(best interests) as set out in the Children Act 1989 (CA).
7
  Although that Act requires the 
courts to have especial regard for ‘the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child 
concerned’ considered in the light of her age and understanding,8 critics have argued that as 
long as courts can demonstrate that the welfare of the child has been the paramount 
consideration in their decision, legislative provisions pertaining to rights can be glossed 
over.
9
  Similarly, various endeavours of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the 
European Union, for example, to combat child sexual exploitation are framed around 
protection,
10
 even though the UNCRC promotes rights.  This may be because emphasising a 
protectionist stance towards children is more likely to generate international agreement, but 
the prominence of concepts such as vulnerability and exploitation makes it easier to perceive 
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minors as being in need of protection rather than as individuals with autonomy deserving 
respect. 
 




 century, there is a keener appreciation of the autonomy of the child and the 
child’s consequential right to participate in decision making processes that 




In this article we expose some of the tensions which surround mature minors (16 and 17 year 
olds) making decisions for themselves.  We focus on this group as they are approaching the 
age of majority and suggest that the dominant paradigms with regards to mature minors in 
England and Wales remain best interests and protectionism,
12
 including ideas of paternalism, 
sanctity of life, beneficence and non-maleficence.  We note that there are obvious differences 
between these four paradigms, however, we place the latter three under the broader umbrella 
of protectionism for the purposes of this paper, suggesting that some decisions made in order 
to protect mature minors reflect an ‘adults know best’ approach, or can be made with the 
primary purpose of protecting life, for example.
13
  Our concern is whether the dominance of 
best interests and protectionism inevitably limits law’s recognition of mature minors’ rights 
(particularly autonomy) as explicated in the HRA.  We explore this matter via two case 
studies (refusing treatment and creating self-generated pornography)
14
 and by applying best 
interests, protectionist and rights based approaches to explore whether different results are 
thereby achieved.
15
  On the face of it we are comparing two dissimilar scenarios covered by 
different branches of law; however, both scenarios involve mature minors’ decision-making 
and behaviour that concern adults because it is (or may be) harmful to health or wellbeing. 
This could be to the extent that the decision to refuse treatment will result in the mature 
minor’s death or impaired health; or a mature minor’s well-being could be affected if, for 
example, a self-generated image of pornography is disseminated to those she knows against 
her wishes.  Just as in health situations there is a desire to protect the life and health of the 
patient, one of the purposes of the criminal law is to deter behaviour which is deemed 
illegitimate or inappropriate, thus protecting individuals.
16
  We accept that in these scenarios 
the interests of parents and/or the state may be different as the desire to preserve the life and 
health of the minor is at stake in one whereas in the other, broader societal issues, such as 
protecting children, may also be of concern.  Nevertheless, this does not impede our 
argument. 
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We suggest that best interests in health care law and the protectionist discourse in the 
criminal law relate to what Parker, in relation to family law, has referred to as the utilitarian 
approach.
17
  He suggested that, in that field, the themes of utility (welfare) and rights were 
identifiable and that family law had become ‘more centrally concerned’ with the former (see 
s 1(1) of the CA 1989) than the latter.
18
  Thus: 
 
family law became predominantly about weighing interests in some kind of balance, 
rather than adjudicating over rights … The most obvious way of accomplishing this 
balancing act, without destroying the flexibility that the system was designed to 
achieve, was by conferring overt and broad judicial discretion, to be exercised in the 




We argue that while the link between utility and best interests is more evident in family and 
health law contexts,
20
 the aim of protecting children similarly leads law makers to take the 
position that they should criminalise behaviour if it helps to achieve this goal.
21
  We thus 
examine the validity of Herring’s contention that although ‘in many cases a welfare and 
rights perspective will produce the same result … The kind of cases which seem to divide 
those taking a rights or a welfare approach are those involving autonomy: the extent to which 
the law should respect the decision of a competent child to do something that harms them.’22  
We show that over a decade after its implementation, whether within health care or criminal 
law, the HRA has yet to significantly alter the ability of mature minors in England and Wales 
to make decisions for themselves; especially decisions which others may view as ‘harmful’.  
Rather, best interests and protectionist approaches continue to dominate and so whichever of 
these theoretical approaches is adopted, there are still some decisions that society is reluctant 
to allow 16 and 17 year olds to make.  Protectionism thus prevails regardless of the wishes of 
the mature minor and, in the context of health and self-generated pornography, best interests 
in the age of human rights remains alive and kicking. 
 
Scenario one: refusing treatment 
Alyssa (16 years and 10 months old) was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukaemia 
when she was 12.  She underwent chemotherapy and, when she was 14, tests revealed 
that her kidneys had been damaged as a result.  The damage was initially minimised by 
a combination of diet and drugs but dialysis is now required and Alyssa has indicated 
that she will not consent to it. 
 
Welfare, best interests and utility 
Consent to Alyssa’s treatment can be provided by (i) her as she is over 16 and if she is 
competent,
23





  The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) applies to anyone over 16 and there 
                                                          
17
 Parker, above, n 15. 
18
 Ibid, p 323. 
19
 Ibid, p 324. 
20
 See H. Fenwick, ‘Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child and the Human Rights Act’ (2004) 67 Modern 
Law Review 889. 
21
 Ost, above, n 14, ch 2. 
22
 J. Herring, ‘Farewell Welfare?’ (2005) 27 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 159, 165. 
23
 ‘the consent of a minor who has attained the age of 16 years to any … medical … treatment … shall be as 
effective as it would be if he were of full age ...’: s 8(1) FLRA 1969. 
24




is a presumption of capacity unless there is evidence otherwise.
26
  Section 2(1) sets out when 
someone lacks capacity
27
 and, in order to be able to make a decision, a person must fulfil all 
of the conditions in section 3 (1).
28
  It is thus presumed that Alyssa is competent to consent to 
treatment, but if she lacks capacity under the Act, decisions will be made in her best 
interests.
29
  Guidance on this is provided in the MCA and its Code of Practice.
30
  If, however, 
Alyssa is unable to make a decision because she is, for example, overwhelmed by the 
situation then the common law will apply, and consent can then be provided by (ii) or (iii), 
again acting in her best interests.   As for refusals, statute is silent but the common law is 
clear; where treatment is recommended by health professionals (because in their clinical 
judgement it is in her best interests to receive it),
31
 Alyssa’s refusal of that treatment does not 
have to be respected and consent can be provided by (ii) or (iii).
32
  In so doing, any decision 
should be made on the basis of Alyssa’s best interests and although no guidance on this exists 
for parents, the courts can look to section 1(1) of the CA 1989 if they are involved.  This 
requires that Alyssa’s welfare is the paramount consideration when the court determines any 
question about her upbringing and, in applying this welfare principle (the best interests test)
33
 
the court should have particular regard to the ‘welfare checklist’ set out in section 1(3).34  
This version of the best interests test will apply if, for example, the court is asked to make a 
specific issues order to determine whether Alyssa should be treated against her or her parents’ 
wishes.
35
  Alternatively, the court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction where its authority 
and powers are ‘theoretically limitless’ and extend beyond those of parents.36  Indeed, ‘if the 
court’s powers are to be meaningful, there must come a point at which the court, while not 
disregarding the child’s wishes, can override them in the child’s own best interests, 
objectively considered.’37 
 
So what does best interests mean?  In Re W, Nolan LJ said that section 1(1) and (3) of the CA 
1989 contained the principles which govern the court’s exercise of its inherent jurisdiction,38 
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and that the court should start from the general premise that ‘the protection of the child’s 
welfare implies at least the protection of the child’s life … [i]n general terms … the present 
state of the law is that an individual who has reached the age of 18 is free to do with his life 
what he wishes, but it is the duty of the court to ensure so far as it can that children survive to 
attain that age.’39  As W’s circumstances had changed when her case was considered by the 
Court, her wishes were ‘completely outweighed by the threat of irreparable damage to her 
health and risk to her life.’40  Best interests are, therefore, premised on protecting the sanctity 
of life, and ‘if the child’s welfare is threatened by a serious and imminent risk that the child 
will suffer grave and irreversible mental or physical harm, then ... the court when called upon 
has a duty to intervene.’41  This stance has been replicated in other cases,42 and in Re J (not a 
mature minor case) Taylor LJ stated that there was a ‘strong presumption in favour of taking 
all steps capable of preserving it, save in exceptional circumstances.’43  While in cases not 
involving mature minors the courts have acknowledged that for a particular individual life is 
not always preferable to death,
44
 to date ‘judges … [have] in almost all cases place[d] life 
itself above all other considerations in considering competent children.’45  For example, in Re 
P, the last reported case to explore best interests and mature minors refusing treatment,
46
 
Johnson J stated that despite ‘weighty and compelling reasons’ not to make the order 
authorising the treatment of ‘John’ (a Jehovah’s Witness who was 16 years and 10 months 
old) against his wishes, ‘looking at the interests of John in the widest possible sense – 
medical, religious, social, whatever they be – my decision is that John’s best interests in those 
widest senses will be met if I make an order in the terms sought by the NHS Trust ...’47  He 
held this even though expressing reluctance at overruling John’s wishes48 because of his 
strong and established religious convictions.
49
  This contrasts with the decision in Re JT 
where 25 year old T, who had learning disabilities and ‘extremely severe behavioural 
disturbance’,50 had her refusal of dialysis respected because she was deemed competent under 
the (then appropriate) Re C test.
51
  Nevertheless, no case has been reported where a mature 
minor’s refusal has been respected and they have died, as a minor. 
 
In Re W Lord Donaldson MR indicated that best interests are also medically grounded 
(beneficence), as the court can override the refusal ‘by authorising the doctors to treat the 
minor in accordance with their clinical judgement, subject to any restrictions which the court 
may impose.’52  Where clinical judgement (= best interests?) is relied on, the courts are clear 
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in their refusal to go behind this, and patients cannot demand the treatment they desire.
53
  
Best interests seemingly sit behind clinical decisions, as doctors only recommend treatment 
which, in their clinical judgement, is necessary and in a patient’s best interests (beneficence).  
This conflation of “best” with “medical” was criticised by the Law Commission,54 and was 
supposed to have been eradicated as its’ recommendations on the issues to be regarded when 
determining best interests for adults without capacity were largely replicated in the MCA 
2005.
55
  Indeed, beyond the context of the CA 1989, the notion of best interests has been 
refined by the courts so that it encompasses medical and emotional issues,
56
 ‘broader ethical, 
social, moral and welfare considerations’,57 and ‘every kind of consideration capable of 
impacting on the decision.  These include, non-exhaustively, medical, emotional, sensory 
(pleasure, pain and suffering) and instinctive (the human instinct to survive) 
considerations.’58  The General Medical Council (GMC) and British Medical Association 
have produced non-exhaustive lists of factors to be considered in best interests assessments,
59
 
and the weight attached to each factor will depend on the case.
60
   
 
As this is so, it is logical to distinguish between the ability of a mature minor to say yes but 
not no,
61
 especially where the treatment is designed to benefit the patient and her refusal 
could/would lead to permanent injury or death.
62
  This argument appears to be further 
predicated on the idea that ‘the best interests test … logically … give[s] only one answer’,63 
even though in considering best interests the doctor may have to choose the best option from 
a range of options.
64
  However, as Douglas notes,
65
 there is often more than one view on 
whether treatment is in a patient’s interests (as recognised in Bolam),66 and even where there 
appears to be agreed medical opinion another view can exist.
67
   There is thus a qualitative 
difference between consent and refusal, so that ‘[o]vercoming a refusal means having to 
interfere with a person’s autonomy, both intellectual and bodily.  On this basis … a person’s 
refusal should be given greater weight … than a consent.’68  Gilmore and Herring have 
recently argued that in refusal of treatment cases there may be two different scenarios at 
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issue; the mature minor is only refusing a particular proposed treatment or she is refusing all 
treatment.
69
  The patient’s capacity to do the former does not necessarily mean she has 
capacity to do the latter and, if that is so, it is vital for parental responsibility to be used to 
enable another to provide consent to treatment.  The decision in Re W might thus be 
distinguished and they partially defend Lord Donaldson’s statement that consent can 
concurrently be held by the mature minor and her parents.
70
  Additionally, it is in their best 
interests to give minors ‘the maximum degree of decision-making which is prudent.  
Prudence does not involve avoiding all risk, but it does involve avoiding taking risks which, 
if they eventuate, may have irreparable consequences or which are disproportionate to the 
benefits which could accrue from taking them.’71  This approach was ‘wholly consistent’ with 
the philosophy of section 1(3)(a) of the CA 1989 in particular;
72
 thus, paternalism 
(protectionism) is also evident in this best interests test.  Indeed, although best interests 
should involve respecting the mature minor’s wishes,73 this is countered by the court’s need 
to protect the sanctity of life.  Where there is a risk of ‘grave and irreversible mental or 
physical harm’, the mature minor’s wishes are therefore given ‘[d]ue weight’ but are not 
binding;
74
 (qualified autonomy).  In Re P, Johnson J said that ‘there may be cases as a child 
approaches the age of 18 when his refusal would be determinative.  A court will have to 
consider whether to override the wishes of a child approaching the age of majority when the 
likelihood is that all that will have been achieved will have been the deferment of an 
inevitable death and for a matter only of months.’75  This mirrored Balcombe LJ’s comments 
in Re W ten years earlier,
76
 but Johnson J provided no guidance on ‘determinative’ cases and 
no judge has yet acted on these dicta. 
 
It is evident that the notion of best interests espoused in the CA 1989 rests on ideas about the 
vulnerability of children and, as such, ‘it has great resonance in the current political climate 
in which vulnerability generally attracts priority.’77  However, it has been criticised for, 
amongst other things, its indeterminancy, uncertainty, lack of transparency, lack of 
consideration of the interests of others, and for not recognising children’s rights.78  Eekelaar 
has sought to reconstruct the best interests test to ‘bring a child to the threshold of adulthood 
with the maximum opportunities to form and pursue life-goals which reflect as closely as 
possible an autonomous choice’,79 by perceiving best interests through objectivization and 
dynamic self-determinisim.  Thus, the ‘decision-maker [should] draw on beliefs which 
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indicate conditions which are deemed to be in the child’s best interests’, beliefs derived from 
the professionals themselves and their own social beliefs, and children should make an 
increasing number of decisions as they grow up but should not be able to make decisions 
which unduly restrict their life choices when they reach adulthood.
80
  Similarly, Herring has 
long called for best interests to be reconceptualised to recognise that the interests of others is, 
and should be, part of a child’s welfare.81  Notably, the maximisation of a minor’s capacity 
has not, to date, been expressly included in the test, but Cave has persuasively argued that it 
should incorporate consideration of the child’s capacity, particularly regarding ‘the emotional 
harms which flow from coercive treatment which will be raised significantly by virtue of the 
child’s competence.’82  This is important because ‘[adolescents] are fast reaching maturity, 
but society has an interest in ensuring that they take responsibility for decision-making over 
important aspects of their lives.  Furthermore, they are being taught to value their status as 
rights-holders and can justifiably argue that they, like adults, have the right to make choices 
over their medical treatment, if competent to do so.’83  We endorse this because without the 
inclusion of this consideration it is unclear how it is hoped that on turning 18 decision-
making capacity arrives intact and fully functional. 
 
Under a best interests assessment, Alyssa’s refusal is likely to be legally overridden by her 
parents or the court if it is deemed to be in her best interests to start dialysis.  As dialysis will 
prolong her life this is a likely conclusion, despite her wishes, because of the importance 
accorded to protecting the sanctity of life of minors and the fact that clinical judgement 
supports this conclusion.  This is so even though in Re JT the realities of forcing dialysis were 
noted by one of T’s doctors: ‘[d]ialysis with restraint would be extremely dangerous and 
would make resuscitation, if necessary, impossible.  Such restraint would make monitoring 
and safety controls impossible to implement and it would constitute dangers to both nurses 
and the patient.’84  Additionally, ‘[h]aemodialsysis is not a one off treatment.  It is not simply 
a case where one surgical intervention is necessary or a diagnostic procedure.  Haemodialysis 
will need to be maintained for the whole of [T]’s life.’85  However, as noted above, the courts 
have never accepted a refusal of treatment that will lead to the death of a mature minor.  We 
thus conclude that, in the light of the principles which appear (often unacknowledged) to sit 
behind best interests tests, Kennedy’s critique remains pertinent: 
 
 The best interests formula may be beloved of family lawyers but … it is not really a 
test at all.  Instead, it is a somewhat crude conclusion of social policy.  It allows 
lawyers and courts to persuade themselves and others that theirs is a principled 
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Four Articles of the ECHR and HRA 1998 might be relevant to Alyssa in a refusal of 
treatment situation; 3, 5, 8, and 14, but there is, as yet, no European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence on mature minors refusing treatment;
87
 thus, reliance must be placed on 
decisions involving adults.  Article 8 will be of primary importance for Alyssa and the 
European Court has recognised that this includes the right to autonomy,
88
 and so could 
support her refusal of dialysis.  However, Alyssa’s rights can be interfered with, under Article 
8(2), provided this interference is prescribed by law, necessary to protect health or morals, or 
the rights and freedoms of others, and is necessary and proportionate.  It may thus be 
justifiable to breach Article 8(1) because refusing dialysis constitutes a serious threat to 
Alyssa’s life, and the interference with her rights is necessary to protect her health, and is 
proportionate to the risks involved if she is not dialysed (i.e. death) and to the infringement of 
her autonomy.
89
  Furthermore, if Alyssa’s parents do not support her position, they could also 
engage Article 8 to argue that their right to private and family life should be respected by 
ensuring that Alyssa is treated even if this is against her wishes.  The court will try to balance 
each family member’s Article 8 rights in the light of the facts of the case.90  Despite this and 
the reach of ECHR rights, in some areas ‘children are still seen as little more than adjuncts of 
their parents’91 and health care is one of these, particularly when life-saving or prolonging 
treatments are at issue.  It is likely then that a court will hold that Alyssa’s parents’ Article 
8(1) rights will be breached if her refusal is respected, and that this breach cannot be justified 
under Article 8(2).
92
  As Sedly LJ has stated, the purpose of Article 8 is not to jeopardise 
welfare but to ‘assure within proper limits the entitlements of individuals to the benefit of 
what is benign and positive in family life.’93  Nevertheless, Hall has suggested that: 
 
[p]arents’ Art 8 rights are now readily overridden where the child’s welfare amounts to 
a sufficient justification as to fall within Art 8(2) (eg, Johnasen v. Norway …; Hoppe v. 
Germany ….) … It has however been squarely stated in Yousef v. The Netherlands … 
that in a dispute between the Art 8 rights of parents and children, those of the child will 
prevail.
94
   
 
Added to this, domestically in Axon, Silber J said that the ‘autonomy of the young person 
must undermine any article 8 rights of a parent to family life,’95 and the parental right to 
family life ceases when a child is Gillick competent.
96
  Yet the autonomy rights of mature 
minors refusing medical treatment have not been, and are unlikely to be, privileged in this 
way because of their apparent conflict with the minor’s other Convention rights. 
 
                                                          
87
 Although it is clear that minors are entitled to the protection offered by the Convention: Re Roddy (A Child) 
(Identification: Restriction on Publication) [2003] EWHC 2927 (Fam); [2004] 2 FLR 949, para 37. 
88
 Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHHR 1, ECHR. 
89
 Similarly with regards to an incompetent adult see Herczegfalvy v. Austria (1992) 15 EHHR 437, ECHR. 
90
 For an argument that the balancing act under Article 8 is not dissimilar to that conducted under s 1(3) CA 
1989 see Fenwick, above, n 20.  Also Re B (A Child) (Adoption By One Natural Parent [2001] UKHL 70; 
[2002] WLR 258, para 31 per Lord Nicholls. 
91
 J. Fortin, ‘Children’s Rights: Are the Courts Now Taking Them More Seriously?’ (2004) 15 King’s College 
Law Journal 254. 
92
 Fortin has critically argued that where there is a conflict between adults and children’s rights, the Court 
routinely only analyses those of the former: Fortin, above, n 9, pp 302-303. 
93
 Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38, 58, CA. 
94
 A. Hall, ‘Children’s Rights, Parents’ Wishes and the State: The Medical Treatment of Children’ [2006] 
Family Law 317, 320-321. 
95
 R (On the Application of Axon) v. Secretary of State for Health (Family Planning Association intervening) 
[2006] EWHC 37 (Admin); [2006] 2 WLR 1130, para 130. 
96
 Ibid, para 131. 
10 
With regards to Article 3, Alyssa could argue that forcing her to undergo dialysis against her 
wishes constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment.  However, this may be easily dealt with 
by following the reasoning in Herczegfalvy v. Austria that forcing an adult without capacity 
to undergo treatment does not breach Article 3 if that treatment is standard and health 
professionals deem it medically necessary (clinical judgement again).
97
  What then of Article 
5, as Alyssa will need to be restrained in order to be dialysed and so her liberty will 
necessarily be restricted, and on a regular basis?  Alyssa may find more merit with this as the 
European Court has held that restraint or detention even for short periods may breach Article 
5, and whether it is a breach will depend, inter alia, on the type, duration, effects and how it 
is performed.
98
  There is a defence if Alyssa is of ‘unsound mind’,99 but if she is competent 
this cannot apply.  Furthermore, ‘courts are traditionally most reluctant to allow children to 
martyr themselves.  Consequently, any court confronted with such a situation might surely 
conclude that it has a duty to protect the teenager’s right to life under Article 2, on his behalf, 
even at the cost of his rights to liberty under Article 5 and to physical integrity under Article 
8.’100  Although Fortin was writing about mature minors with religious objections to proposed 
treatment, a court may adopt this stance with Alyssa, particularly given the strength of 
medical need and sanctity of life arguments combining in the all-powerful best interests 
argument.  Finally, without a breach of a substantive right under any other Articles, Alyssa’s 
claim under Article 14 will necessarily fail since this Article only has effect in relation to 
other Convention rights. 
 
A court may, however, ‘hesitate before asserting its own duty to preserve the life of a 
resisting patient if it considers that the patient is legally capable of making up his or her own 
mind over that matter’,101 but this has yet to occur.  Indeed, ‘a court might maintain that it 
cannot ignore its duty to save the life of a desperately ill adolescent, despite his or her own 
strong opposition to treatment.’102  This is, of course, the status quo and is supported by the 
right to life set out in Article 2 and the positive obligation on the state to take appropriate 
steps to safeguard life.
103
  Thus, it is not inevitable that a mature minor’s refusal of treatment 
will now be successfully protected under the Convention, particularly given the margin of 
appreciation and the doctrine of proportionality which can be seen as ‘requiring a balance of 
community and individual interests.’104  Mason and Laurie thus argue that ‘[t]he English 
courts have made a concerted effort to demonstrate their desire to find a balance in [mature 
minor] cases and there is little in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
that would lead them to upset that delicate equilibrium.’105  In contrast, Garwood-Gowers 
doubts whether denying competent minors autonomy would meet the requirement of 
proportionality.  He suggests that as it is not legal to force treatment on competent adults, it 
amounts to age discrimination to do so to competent minors, thus breaching Article 14.
106
  
However, although children’s rights have gained increasing recognition in European and 
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 and ‘views about the decision-making abilities of adolescents have 
changed considerably since the late 1980s’,108 the rights which are protected in the HRA 
1998 (and apply regardless of age) do not automatically translate into Alyssa’s autonomy 
being protected under the Act. 
 
Thus, applying the best interests test as espoused in both statute and the common law is likely 
to enable Alyssa’s refusal of treatment to be overridden by either the court, under its inherent 
jurisdiction, or her parents exercising their parental responsibility.  Similarly, her autonomy 
rights under the HRA 1998 can be infringed to save and protect her life.   For mature minors 
then, it does not matter which theoretical approach is employed; courts in England and Wales 
are unlikely to support their refusal of life-saving treatment.
109
  Is this also true for our second 
scenario? 
 
Scenario two: creating self-generated pornography  
Alyssa has a boyfriend Ronan (17).  They have been in a relationship for six months.  
They see each other regularly and often stay the night with each other at their parents’ 
houses.  They have an active, expressive sexual relationship.  Alyssa wants to take a 
photograph of Ronan engaging in sexual behaviour (to which he freely consents) purely 
for their own private sexual purposes. 
 
Protectionism and utility 
As minors who have reached the age of sexual consent, Alyssa and Ronan do not commit any 
offence by engaging in sexual activity. However, if Alyssa goes ahead and takes the 
photograph of Ronan she will commit a criminal offence because under the Protection of 
Children Act (PCA) 1978, it is an offence to take, make or permit to be taken an indecent 
photograph of a child.
110
  A photograph of a child is ‘indecent’ if ordinary people would view 
it as such, by applying recognised standards of propriety.
111
  For the purpose of the laws 
regarding indecent photographs of children, a child used to be defined as an individual under 
the age of 16; however, and significantly, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA) redefined a 
child as those under 18.
112
  This change brought English law into line with the definition of a 
child in the UNCRC and the European Council Framework Decision on Combating the 
Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography.
113
  A defence exists if the child in 
the photograph is over 16 and married to, in a civil partnership with, or living together as 
partners with the defendant in an ‘enduring family relationship.’114  Sufficient evidence must 
be adduced that the child consented to the taking of the photograph, or that the defendant 
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‘reasonably believed that the child so consented.’115  This defence thus only offers protection 
to a mature minor’s expression of her sexual liberty in a very specific context116 and, on our 
facts, does not apply to Alyssa. Moreover, Ronan appears to have committed an offence if he 
permits her to take the photograph.
117
  Although it might be assumed that the offence was 
targeted at an adult permitting another to take an indecent image of the child, this is not made 
clear in the legislation.  
 
The criminalisation of Alyssa’s intended behaviour sits uncomfortably with the law 
surrounding the age of sexual consent; it is illogical and inconsistent that Alyssa and Ronan’s 
sexual acts are lawful but their recording of these acts is not.
118
  The Government emphasised 
that the SOA’s expansion of the criminal law to 16 and 17 year olds would be accompanied 
by prosecutorial discretion,
119
 but the existence of such discretion does not change the fact 
that what Alyssa proposes to do is deemed to be criminal behaviour.
120
 The expansion of 
offences regarding indecent photographs of children to 16 and 17 year olds’ creation of self-
generated pornography evidences a protectionist discourse surrounding children within the 
criminal law, in which their personal autonomy rights are ignored when adults perceive their 
decisions to be harmful to their well-being.  Criminalising this behaviour is considered to 
serve society’s goal of protecting children from the dangers of sexual exploitation and harm 
and thus reflects a utilitarian legal approach
121
 in the same way as the application of best 
interests does in our first scenario.  Yet, at the same time, since the age of consent is set at 16, 
Alyssa and Ronan can give valid consent to any number of acts of unprotected sex that 
potentially could be very harmful and might result in a possible unwanted pregnancy.
122
  
While the recognition of mature minors’ sexual liberty rights may have resulted in a 
reduction in the age of consent, Parliament chose to apply an ‘adults know best’, protectionist 
approach to re-shape the definition of a child under the law in this area.  This may have been 
because continuing with the lower age definition of a child would have risked our criminal 
law facing the criticism that it was not tackling the sexual exploitation of 16 and 17 year olds 
through the production of images of child sexual abuse.  Indeed, our society is anxious to 
cover all children with the same shield against potential and perceived harm.
123
  In this 
regard, protectionism takes the form of a version of paternalism and outweighs mature 
minors’ autonomy rights concerns in this context.  The limited defence available does little to 
offset this discounting of children’s autonomy rights, especially since it ‘shows no 
recognition for the realities of teenage sexuality.’124  In addition, the defence effectively 
                                                          
115
 s 1A(4) PCA 1978. 
116
 Also A.A. Gillespie, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (3) Tinkering With ‘Child Pornography’ [2004] 
Criminal Law Review 361, 364. 
117
 s 1(1)(a) PCA 1978. 
118
 Gillespie, above, n 116, p 364. The criminalisation of consenting children brought about by the SOA more 
generally has been critiqued see, for example, M. Waites, The Age of Consent: Young People, Sexuality and 
Citizenship (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
119
 Home Office, above, n 112; Home Office, Protecting the Public. Cm 5668 (HMSO, 2002).  During the 
House of Lords reading of the Sexual Offences Bill, Lord Falconer commented (in respect of the offences 
generally) that ‘[w]e are keen to ensure that proper protection be given ... to children ... That will mean, as it 
does now in relation to current offences, that one must criminalise certain activities that, on the facts of a 
particular case, would never merit a prosecution because it would not be in the public interest for there to be 
one. Hansard, HL Deb, 13 February 2003: columns 875-876. 
120
 See, generally, Waites, above, n 118, pp. 199, 202. On prosecutorial discretion, see A.A. Gillespie, Child 
Pornography: Law and Policy (Routledge, 2012), p. 225. 
121
 Parker, above, n 15. 
122
 Gillespie, above, n 120, p 18. 
123
 Home Office, above, n 112, para 7.6.3. 
124
 Gillespie, above, n 120, p 228. 
13 
‘say[s] that it is acceptable for some [mature minors to take photographs of each other] but 
dangerous for others.’125  But it cannot be right that simply being in one of the categories of 
relationship stated within the defence legitimates or makes safe behaviour that is considered 
potentially harmful enough to criminalise where such a relationship does not exist. 
 
So what are the (possible) harms that could occur as a consequence of mature minors taking 
sexually explicit photographs of each other that might justify the protectionist stance taken by 
the criminal law?  The first matter to note is a crucial difference between health care law and 
criminal law: unlike the former, the latter cannot be decided on a case-by-case basis, although 
prosecutorial discretion involves some degree of individualised decision-making.
126
  In the 
particular case before the civil court, the issue of best interests is considered solely in respect 
of the mature minor who is refusing treatment, even though regard will be had to previous 
decisions.  But sexually explicit photographs of children are more than just an individual 
matter and so whereas the best interests approach as applied in scenario one focuses on harm 
to Alyssa, the protectionist discourse to be found in the criminal law surrounding such 
photographs is focused on harm to the children in the images and to children as a group, 
broadly conceived.  Bearing this in mind, we begin with the possible harms to Ronan.  
Imagine that Alyssa takes the photograph with her mobile phone and later sends it to her 
friend without Ronan’s consent, or that he and Alyssa split up acrimoniously and Alyssa 
posts the photograph on the web out of spite.  Gillespie highlights the potential easy misuse 
of self-generated material once the photograph has been sent to another teenager by ‘sexting’ 
via mobile phones or by email.
127
  The photograph can quickly be passed onto others and 
Alyssa’s control over who sees the image is rapidly lost.  Research suggests that adolescents 
may not realise the potential risks that self-generated pornographic photographs pose; for 
instance, Ronan might be solicited if the image is traced back to him, he might suffer damage 
to his reputation and, in the future, suffer damage to his career if the photograph surfaces.
128
  
While it may be true that some 16 and 17 year olds do not consider these risks, this is also 
true for some adults.  Take the recent well-publicised example of a camera-phone film of pop 
celebrity Tulisa Contostavlos engaged in consensual, sexually explicit behaviour.  She has 
obtained an injunction banning publication and distribution of the film.
129
  One journalist 
described the release of the film as ‘merciless, destructive bullying’, stating that the 
distributor acted ‘out of malice, and out of a wish to exploit Contostavlos's embarrassment 
and hurt for money.’ 130  Thus, the existence of a recording of someone engaged in sexually 
explicit acts which they have recorded themselves or allowed to be recorded, can put the 
individual at risk of exploitation and other negative consequences such as bullying and 
blackmail regardless of their age.  Such risks thus do not in themselves justify criminalising 
Alyssa’s actions when such behaviour would not be criminalised if Ronan were 18.  
Moreover, any showing or dissemination of indecent photographs of children is prohibited 
under the PCA 1978,
131
 and so it is not the case that allowing mature minors to express their 
sexual liberty by creating pornographic photographs of themselves for their own use would 
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mean that subsequent distribution and the potential associated harms are permitted by the 
criminal law. 
 
However there is not just potential harm to Ronan; other teenagers and children might be 
harmed if the photograph is subsequently used for grooming.
132
  The photograph could end 
up in the hands of a groomer if, for example, Alyssa and Ronan split up and she posts it on 
the web.  Indeed, the addition of this photograph on the web increases the amount of sexually 
explicit images of children available, and so Alyssa’s actions could encourage the market in 
such material
133
 and the perception that children can be used as sexual objects.
134
  Or Alyssa 
and Ronan might decide to sell this and other photographs of each other that they 
subsequently take to make a profit by creating a website for interested paying parties.
135
 But 
these are all speculative harms that are more remote to the initial consensual creation of the 
photograph for personal use by two mature minors above the age of consent.
136
 The risk of 
these harms is more directly connected to the distribution of the photograph(s), which, as we 
have already noted, is prohibited.
137
 However, a protectionist legal response of safeguarding 
mature minors against these potential harms is evidenced in an interesting American case that 
offers an example of adolescent self-produced pornography comparable to our scenario.  This 
case is not of this jurisdiction and a similar case in England and Wales might be decided 
differently; however, we utilise it to demonstrate the assumptions underlying the 
criminalisation which has occurred both here and in the US.  In A.H. v. State of Florida, a 
girlfriend (AH, aged 16) and boyfriend (J, aged 17) took photographs of themselves naked 
and engaged in sexual behaviour and then emailed the photographs to J’s computer.138  Their 
intention throughout was to keep the photographs for their own personal use.  AH and J were 
both charged with offences relating to producing child pornography.  AH was adjudicated 
delinquent
139
 by the trial court and appealed this decision, arguing that her behaviour was 
protected because her privacy interests were implicated.  The District Court of Appeal of 
Florida affirmed the trial court’s decision, and Wolf J stated that the ‘compelling state interest 
in protecting children from sexual exploitation... exists whether the person sexually exploiting 
the child is an adult or a minor...’. He went on to say that ‘The State’s purpose in [the 
relevant statute] is to protect minors from exploitation by anyone who induces them to appear 
in a sexual performance and shows that performance to other people.’140  
  
There are three questionable assumptions in this statement justifying the protectionist legal 
approach adopted.  First, that AH sexually exploited J.  None of the characteristics associated 
with exploitative behaviour are present since neither AH or J used each other wrongfully 
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and/or solely as a means to an end.
141
  Not all would agree and Leary, for example, contends 
that ‘self-exploitation by minors... is the creation by a minor of visual depictions of that 
minor and/or other minors engaged in sexual explicit conduct.’142  Therefore, according to 
Leary’s position, the self-creation of such images in any situation constitutes (self) 
exploitation.  However, absent some kind of wrongful misuse, the label of exploitation is not 
appropriately attached to AH’s behaviour.143 Secondly, there is no evidence in the judgment 
to suggest that AH induced J to appear in the photographs and, finally, AH did not show the 
photographs to anyone else other than J.  Nevertheless, in explicating the possible future 
harms to mature minors who self-produce pornography, Wolf J noted (without supporting 
evidence) the future risk of damage to their careers or personal lives and asserted that ‘[m]ere 
production of these... pictures may also result in psychological trauma to the teenagers 
involved.’144  Paternalistic, almost condescending, attitudes towards teenage sexual 
relationships were evident elsewhere in the judgment. Thus, it is unsurprising that the 
majority held that the state had a compelling interest in preventing the production of the 
photographs despite AH and J’s intentions only to use them for private use, since it was 
reasonable to expect that, in the future, AH or J would share the photographs with others: 
 
Minors who are involved in a sexual relationship unlike adults who may be involved in 
a mature committed relationship, have no reasonable expectation that their relationship 
will continue and that the photographs will not be shared with others intentionally or 
unintentionally... A reasonably prudent person would believe that if you put this type of 
material in a teenager’s hands that, at some point either for profit or bragging rights, the 




Applying this broad-brush protectionist approach, the majority judgment contrasted teenage 
sexual relationships to mature, committed adult relationships and, significantly, failed to 
consider the possibility that some teenage relationships can be mature and committed, in the 
same way that some adult relationships can lack these characteristics.  The majority judgment 
presented teenagers as being in need of protection from themselves, otherwise they will 
sexually exploit each other for profit or to enhance their sexual reputations.  According to 
Padovano J, the dissenting judge, whether AH should have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy was being ‘measured by the collective wisdom of appellate judges who have no 
emotional connection to the event.’146 
 
There is a parallel here with the best interests approach taken in refusal of medical treatment 
cases in that, just as the durability of mature minors’ strongly held religious beliefs are 
routinely questioned,
147
 so too is the longevity of their sexual relationships.  Furthermore, the 
protectionist discourse evident in this area of law is even less supportive of mature minors’ 
autonomy than the utility approach centred on best interests under health law.  This is 
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because the former encapsulates a broader idea of harm to other children beyond the mature 
minor and because, in the context of sexually explicit images of minors, even if such material 
is created consensually by minors themselves, a risk of future sexual exploitation suffices to 
restrict mature minors’ rights.  In the context of the existing defence, there is evidence of a 
moralistic discourse feeding into the law’s protectionist stance because being married to or 
living with the individual who takes the mature minor’s photograph cannot in itself ensure 
that the mature minor is not exploited.  Thus, the criminal prohibition placed on Alyssa’s 
behaviour, albeit accompanied by prosecutorial discretion, appears to be an example of the 
criminalisation of behaviour which adults consider to be wrong or inappropriate.
148
  It is also 
important to bear in mind that following the increase in the age of a child for the purposes of 
the offences related to indecent photographs of children, the criminalisation of mature 






for young people grappling with issues of sexual identity and self-awareness, private 





The rights engaged here are those under Articles 8, 10 and 14 of the ECHR, the rights to 
privacy and personal autonomy, freedom of expression and, potentially, Alyssa’s freedom 
from discrimination.  Case law has demonstrated that (private) sexual behaviour is protected 
under Article 8.
151
  However, neither of these rights is absolute and we have already noted 
when infringement can be justified under Article 8(2).
152
  Indeed, to date, attempts to bring a 
human rights challenge to the offence of making an indecent photograph of a child under 
these Articles have failed. In R v. Smethurst, for instance, the objective of protecting children 
justified infringing the rights espoused in these Articles:  
 
The exception in Article 10(2) covers this case.  In our judgment, the requirement to 
protect children justifies the terms of the offence... It is there for the prevention of 





Therefore it is clear that in cases of child sexual abuse and exploitation through images of 
child sexual abuse, protectionist arguments outweigh any concerns that rights to privacy and 
freedom of expression are being violated.  But the differences between sexual abuse and 
exploitation through such images and our case study of consenting mature minors exercising 
their sexual expression to create self-generated pornography are important.  It is surely true 
that ‘no viable comparison exists between adults who molest children and record their 
monstrous exploits and adolescents who memorialize their sexual experiences with each 
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other.’154  In the former, the idea that privacy rights could trump the state’s interest in 
criminalisation for the purposes of child protection is outrageous.  However, in the latter, 
provided the self-produced photograph is used privately by the two minors only, there has 
been no exploitation or sexual abuse and thus privacy and freedom of expression based 
claims are more compelling.
155
  The argument that Article 8 and Article 10 rights can be 
legitimately violated in order to protect children from harm is consequently weaker.  
Moreover, because those over 18 are permitted to create self-generated photographs, 
provided her rights under Article 8 or 10 are engaged,
 156
 Alyssa could have a claim under 




Interestingly, it was rights based concerns that led to the creation of the existing defence; 
however, the focus was on possible violations of the privacy of a marital or enduring 
relationship under Articles 8 and 12.
158
  It thus seems that mature minors rights claims are 
most likely to be accepted if they are involved in a relationship sanctified by law.
159
 So how 
likely is it that the courts would accept these claims beyond relationships deemed to warrant 
protection from an invasion of privacy?  As Johnson has observed, ‘[c]hild pornography 
pushes the furthest boundaries of the principle of freedom of expression, as such content 
tends to fall outside almost any argument for the value of protecting what people wish to 
write, say or draw.’160  Recognising the privacy and sexual expression rights of mature 
minors over the age of sexual consent to take pornographic photographs of themselves for 
their personal use, would go against the tide of the continual push towards increasing 
criminalisation of any material deemed to pose a (potential) threat to children.
161
  Moreover, 
in defence of continued criminalisation, it is impossible to eliminate the risk that the 
photograph Alyssa takes is seen by others; especially if it is stored on her mobile phone or 
computer.
162
 As such, her rights under Articles 8 and 10 could be justifiably violated in order 
to protect other children’s rights to be free from the harms of sexual abuse and exploitation 
which could follow distribution of the image.  And when it comes to protecting children from 
the harms of sexual exploitation, no risk, however small, is considered worth taking.  This is 
what differentiates this scenario from other contexts where it has been suggested that mature 
minors’ freedom of expression rights should outweigh more paternalistic welfare concerns.163  
 
Furthermore, despite the harms consequent on distribution being speculative, the fact that 
they are a possibility suggests that Alyssa is making an unwise decision; indicating an 
immaturity of mind.  She thus may have a right to be protected from her own unwise 
decisions, in line with the interest theory of rights ‘... which affirms the part to be played by 
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paternalism to protect future choice...’.164  In accordance with this theory it is, therefore, the 
state’s duty to protect her significant interest in being safe from harm165 and this is achieved 
by preventing her from creating self-generated pornography.  However, the decision to create 
self-produced pornography despite the potential risk of future harm can also be made by 
adults.  Since this suggests that mature minds can make irresponsible decisions, should adults 
also not have a right to have their important interest in safety from harm protected and thus 
be safeguarded from their unwise decisions by the state?  Moreover, the reality of the 
situation when mature minors’ rights are infringed on the basis of ifs, possibilities and 
speculative harms must be recognised.  In the words of the dissenting judge in A.H. v. State 
of Florida, ‘there is always a possibility that something a person intends to keep private will 
eventually be disclosed to others.  But we cannot gauge the reasonableness of a person’s 
expectation of privacy merely by speculating about the many ways in which it might be 
violated.’166  In short, as things stand, the state’s infringement of mature minors’ rights is 
justified because there is a possible risk that their rights might be violated in the future.  A 
parallel with refusal of treatment is thus evident, with protectionism in that context being 
viewed through the lens of best interests, especially protecting the sanctity of life and 
respecting clinical judgement. 
 
Conclusion 
Bainham has asked whether, in terms of the legal resolution of cases, there is any difference 
between protecting children’s welfare/acting in their best interests and taking account of their 
rights.
167
  In our scenarios there is not.  Whichever approach is adopted, the result is likely to 
be the same; the overriding of adolescent autonomy because receiving treatment is deemed to 
be in her best interests or because it is considered that she needs to be protected against her 
own unwise decision and/or this decision would put other children at risk.  It seems that 
whether utility or a human rights approach is adopted, value judgments are at the centre of 
judicial reasoning when important values clash
168
 (privacy, autonomy and freedom of 
expression versus providing treatment that will save a child’s life or criminalising behaviour 
to protect children).  This provides an explanation for the fact that it is easier to find support 
for children’s rights in the context of cases relating to their protection.169  Indeed, Fortin has 
argued that ‘the claim that a rights-based approach must necessarily be devoid of any element 
of any paternalism or ‘welfare’ misconstrues the concept of rights.’170  Thus, whilst these 
approaches differ in the focus of who makes the decisions (in the case of rights, the 
competent child, and in the case of welfare, adults), beyond that there are more similarities 
than differences.  In fact, there is often an element of best interests (welfare/paternalism) in 
the arguments of many proponents of children’s rights;171 but one notable difference is that 
whereas the best interests of the child must be paramount under the CA 1989, best interests 
may, if relevant, form part of a consideration under an Article of the HRA but the Act does 
not require it to take precedence.  Thus, under the Act ‘no one rule (that of the best interests 
of the child) prevails automatically and … if the best interests of the child do prevail it is only 
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after a detailed consideration of all the parties’ rights and interests on an equal footing has 
taken place.’172 
 
At the heart of law and society’s response to mature minors’ decision-making and behaviour 
in the contexts we have explored is a paternalistic attitude reflected in the GMC’s statement 
that: 
 
[c]hildren and young people may be particularly vulnerable and need to be protected 
from harm; they can often find it difficult… defending their rights; and they often rely 
on others for their well-being.  They… may need help to make decisions.173  
 
Children can be a vulnerable group in society, but why should this lead to the assumption that 
mature minors are not capable of making autonomous decisions that could impact adversely 
on them?  The current legal approach ensures that adults’ value judgments take precedence, 
with the consequence that 16 and 17 year olds are prevented from ‘lead[ing their] lives in 
accordance with the values that are theirs’174 because adults disagree with the decisions that 
they make. 
 
It is more understandable that a broad brush approach towards protecting children from harm 
is taken in criminal law because this law is aimed at protecting children as a group and carries 
with it an imperative of certainty.
175
  Yet in health care law when the court is making a 
decision that is focused on the particular child before the court, this broad brush, status 
approach is still being adopted where a child’s life is at risk because of her refusal of 
treatment, regardless of the child’s level of maturity and autonomy.  As Elliston has noted, 
‘[t]he present approach of the English courts diverts attention away from the individual and 
towards the membership of the class of children’.176  This reinforces assumptions of a generic 
vulnerability that equates with a (perceived) lack of capacity for all those under 18.  For what 
purpose is this legal approach taken?  What and whose interests are being served by saving a 
mature minor’s life at the cost of respecting their autonomy when on their 18th birthday they 
can make the same decision they have been seeking to make from the day of their 16
th
 
birthday; to refuse treatment and take the consequences?
177
  And, in the context of self-
generated pornography, are we really protecting mature minors from harm when as soon as 
they reach their 18
th
 birthday they can lawfully create material that they were prohibited from 
creating the day before?  Have the possible negative consequences magically vanished? We 
suggest that something more is going on here than saving lives and protecting children from 
harm.  As a society we seem to struggle to come to terms with the fact that 16 and 17 year 
olds are soon going to be independent decision-makers, free from the confining rules set by 
their parents.  More specifically, some parents are afraid of releasing their power over their 
                                                          
172
 S. Choudhry, ‘The Adoption and Children Act 2002, the Welfare Principle and the Human Rights Act 1998 – 
A Missed Opportunity?’ (2003) 15 Child and Family Law Quarterly 119, 128, emphasis in original.  In 
subsequent publications this has been amended to ‘on a presumptively equal footing’: S. Choudhry, H. Fenwick, 
‘Taking the Rights of Parents and Children Seriously: Confronting the Welfare Principle under the Human 
Rights Act’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 453, 479, emphasis in original. 
173
 GMC, 0-18 years, above, n 31, para. 6. 
174
 J. Coggon, ‘Best Interests, Public Interest, and the Power of the Medical Profession’ (2008) 16  Health Care 
Analysis 219, 223. 
175
 See M. Brazier, S. Ost, Medicine and Bioethics in the Theatre of the Criminal Process (Cambridge University 
Press, forthcoming 2013), Ch. 8. 
176
 Elliston, above, n 45, p 52. 
177
 Note the decision in Re E, above, n 42 above, where Ward J authorised the treatment of 16 year old 
Jehovah’s Witness with blood products, treatment which E subsequently refused when he turned 18 and died. 
20 
adolescent offspring because they are ‘their babies’. They want to continue looking after 
them, doing things for them; ‘protecting them’.  At the same time, the state seems unwilling 
to surrender its own control over some minors in some contexts, while in others responsibility 
is ascribed at a much earlier stage.
178
  As McK. Norrie cogently argues: 
 
we have to be very clear why the law grants its protection … a residual feeling exists in 
England that parents can control their children: it is … a power game in which the 
balance of power rests with parents.  This has little to do with protection of the young 
person, and more to do with control ... Any explanation is lacking if it does not explain 
why there is a difference between the mentally mature 17 year old and the 18 year old.  
A presumption in favour of life may for example explain the legal position, but 
autonomy is held to override that with the 18 year old and we must discover why 
autonomy does not override that presumption for the 17 year old … autonomy is seen 
by the English courts as a concession by the state, and the state thinks it has an interest 
to limit those to whom it grants autonomy.  The state by definition likes to control 
people, and though it cannot control adults fully, it retains its control of minors.  The 
consequence of this is that children and young persons in England and Wales live 




So what is the way forward?  If society cannot accept the possible risk of negative 
consequences that comes with freeing mature minors from the control of adults and the state, 
then the least it can do is be more honest with those minors about what they are permitted to 
do in the context of our scenarios.
180
  An honest explanation of the legal position would then 
be as follows: 
 
At 16 or 17 you will be prevented from making a decision or behaving in a way that 
poses a risk of harm to you or other adolescents and children through an application 
of a best interests or rights based approach.  You are entitled to respect for your rights 
provided that what you intend to do through your exercise of these rights is judged by 
adults to be appropriate to your welfare and in your best interests, since this evidences 
the maturity required to make an autonomous decision.  This approach is justified 
because, until you reach the age of majority (18), adults know what is best for you. 
 
If this is what society wants, then it should be clear about it. 
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